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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
PlaintifCAppellee
CaseNo.20100668-CA

vs.
LONNY HIGH
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue. At trial in this case, the District Court permitted the State to cross-examine
Appellant Lonny High concerning his participation, as a member of the PVL gang, in
gang fights that were unrelated to the charges in this case, as well the methods of gaining
status in the PVL gang through violent actions. The issue presented in this case is
whether the District Court erred in admitting this evidence over High's objection that the
evidence was inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Standards of Review.

This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit

evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001
UT 60, % 42, 28 P.3d 1278; State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f 19, 993 P.2d 837. In doing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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so, this Court reviews the record to determine whether the admission of other bad acts
evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in the proper exercise of its
discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 16, 6 P.3d 1120. The failure of a
trial court to undertake a scrupulous examination in connection with the admission of
prior bad act evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Webster, 2000 UT App
238, % 11, 32 P.3d 976. However, this Court will not reverse a jury verdict based on the
erroneous admission of evidence unless the defendant has been prejudiced as a result.
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 34, 163 P.3d 695.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
Lonny High appeals from the judgment of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth

District Court, after his convictions of one count of party to the offense of aggravated
assault (in concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, and one count of
party to the offense of riot, a third degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Lonny High was charged by Criminal Information filed on October 30, 2009 in

Fourth District Court with: Count 1—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in
concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-2-202, Count 2—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in
concert with two or more persons), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-2-202; Count 3—party to the offense of riot, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101; and Count 4—party to the offense of
obstructing justice, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306.
(R.3-1.)
Count 4 was dismissed at a preliminary hearing on January 20, 2010, and the
District Court found probable cause to bind the three remaining charges over for trial.
(R. 26; 208-207; 231:55; 233:4.) High pled not guilty to the three remaining charges at
the preliminary hearing. (R. 231:56-57.)
On July 12, 2010, High filed a demand for notice of any evidence that the State
sought to introduce under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). (R. 63-62.) On July 13, 2010, High
filed a motion to exclude any evidence of prior crimes for impeachment purposes. (R.
81-75.)
The State responded to High's demand for notice of 404(b) evidence on July 27,
2010. (R. 199-192.) The State provided notice that it intended to introduce the following
evidence at trial:
1. That [High] is a self admitted member of and associated with Provo Vatos
Locos ("PVL".)
2. That [High] has PVL tattoed [sic] on his body.
3. That [High's co-defendant Saul Cristobal] is a self admitted member of and
associated with PVL.
4. That on May 20, 2009 [High] participated as a party to the offense of Assault,
substantial bodily injury, in concert with two or more persons, a third degree
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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felony while in the boundaries of the Provo River Parkway.
5. That [High] knowingly committed the crime in concert with fellow gang
members from PVL to include [co-defendant Cristobal].
6. That Provo River parkway is PVL claimed territory.
(R. 199-198.) The State argued that all of the above evidence was admissible under Utah
R. Evid. 404(b). (R. 195-193.)
Also on July 27, 2010, the State responded to High's motion to exclude evidence
of prior crimes for impeachment purposes, arguing that the District Court should permit
the State to establish that High had previously been convicted of a felony, but that the
District Court should exclude evidence of the name of the felony for which High was
convicted and the factual basis of the crime. (R. 204-202.)
On the first day of trial, August 5, 2010, before jury selection, the District Court
ruled that evidence of High's felony conviction would be inadmissible unless High
testified at trial. (R. 233:12-13.) The District Court also ruled that evidence that High
had the letters "PVL" tattooed on his body, and that someone yelled "PVL" during the
course of the alleged crime, was admissible. (R. 233:5-13.)
At that time, High also asked the District Court to rule whether testimony
regarding the meaning of the acronym PVL, or the nature and activities of the PVL gang,
would be admissible. (R. 233:10-11.) The State argued that such evidence would be
admissible if High testified at trial. (R. 233:11-12.) The District Court declined to rule
on the issue at that time. (R. 233:12.)
On the morning of the second day of trial, August 6, 2010, High notified the
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District Court that he intended to testify. (R. 234:256.) The District Court then ruled that
the State could establish, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a), the fact of High's prior felony
conviction on cross-examination, but was prohibited from introducing evidence of the
name or factual basis of the crime. (R. 234:268-269.)
The District Court also addressed the issue of gang evidence. (R. 234:265-274.)
The District Court ruled that the State could establish that High and co-defendant
Cristobal were members of PVL, but declined to make a definitive ruling as to the
admissibility of other evidence regarding PVL. (R. 234:270-274.) The District Court
instead instructed High to object during trial if the State sought to introduce inadmissible
evidence concerning PVL. (R. 234:270-274.)
High testified on direct and cross-examination that he said the letters "PVL" after
the alleged incident, that PVL was a gang, that he was a member of PVL, that he had the
letters "PVL" tattooed on his hand, and that co-defendant Cristobal was a former member
of PVL. (R. 234:298-29.) After these facts were established on cross-examination, the
State asked, "Okay, now this organization, PVL, what does it do; what is it about?" (R.
234:305.) High objected to this question in a sidebar conference on the grounds of Rules
404(b) and 403. (R. 234:305-306, 358-360.)
High's objection was overruled, and over High's ongoing objection, the State
established that High had been personally involved in illegal fights between PVL and
rival gangs, and also established that members of PVL gained status in the gang through
violent actions. (R. 234:305-309, 399.)
High made a record of the District Court's ruling in the sidebar conference at the
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close of evidence.

(R. 234:358-360, 362-365.)

He argued that the admission of

evidence, over his objection, concerning his violent gang activities unrelated to the crime
charged at trial was inadmissible character evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), and had
so prejudiced the jury as to warrant a mistrial. (R. 234:358-360, 362-365.)
The District Court denied High's motion for a mistrial, and permitted High to draft
a curative jury instruction. (R. 234:366-368.)
At the conclusion of trial on August 6, 2010, the State dismissed Count 2, and
High was convicted of Count 1—party to the offense of aggravated assault (in concert
with two or more persons), a second degree felony, and Count 3—party to the offense of
riot, a third degree felony. (R. 222; 223; 234:353.)
Immediately following trial, High was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in prison on the
aggravated assault conviction, and 0 to 5 years in prison on the riot conviction. (R. 222;
234:414.)
High filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2010. (R. 229.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The alleged victims in this case were Desi and Emilio Maciel. At trial, Desi and
Emilio Maciel testified that they were assaulted by High, co-defendant Cristobal, and a
third unidentified individual on the Provo River Trail on October 24, 2009. Earlier in the
day, Desi and a friend had encountered these three individuals on the Provo River Trial,
and Desi testified that the three individuals detained his friend and demanded cigarettes.
(R. 233:129, 177-178, 180-181, 193.)
Desi testified that approximately an hour later he was by himself on the Provo
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River Trail when he encountered the three individuals again. (R. 233:182-183.) As Desi
rode by on a skateboard, Cristobal asked "What are you looking at?" (R. 233:182-183.)
Desi and Emilio testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. they were walking
home on the Provo River Trail when they again encountered the third unidentified
individual.

(R. 233:129-130, 184.) As the unidentified individual passed them, he

whistled and was joined by High and Cristobal: the three then began to follow Desi and
Emilio. (R. 233:129, 133, 153, 206.)
Desi and Emilio asked the three individuals to stop following them. (R. 233:134.)
Desi called them "wannabe gangsters." (R. 233:134, 188.)
Cristobal then picked up a rock.

(R. 233:136, 159, 185.) Cristobal and the

unidentified individual rushed Desi and pushed him to the ground. (R. 233:136, 162,
168.) Cristobal hit Desi in the head with the rock, and the unidentified individual hit Desi
in the head with a stick. (R. 233:185-187, 199.)
Meanwhile, High threw two punches at Emilio Maciel. (R. 233:137, 161.) When
neither punch connected, Emilio struck High with his knee and threw him to the ground.
(R. 233:140, 161-162.) Emilio then pulled the unidentified individual, who was still
assaulting Desi, to his feet. (R. 233:140.) The unidentified individual struck Emilio in
the head with a stick. (R. 233:140.)
All three assailants then ran off.

(R. 233:143.) As they ran off, the assailants

yelled the letters "PVL." (R. 233:143.) After the assailants had fled, Desi and Emilio
called the police. (R. 233:144-145.) Police identified High and Cristobal as potential
suspects, and that same evening, Officer Troy Cook drove Desi and Emilio to two nearby
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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residences, where they identified High and Cristobal. (R. 148, 220, 229.)
i

High's testimony at trial contradicted Desi's and Emilio's testimony.

High

testified that on the evening of October 24, 2009, he and Cristobal were approached by
an unidentified man on the Provo River Trail who asked for cigarettes. (R. 234:277-280.)

(

When they told him they didn't have any cigarettes, the man proceeded down the trail
and approached Desi Maciel and his friend.

(234:283-285.) As High and Cristobal

passed by, Cristobal remarked to Desi and his friend that the man was drunk.

(R.

234:285.)
Approximately fifteen minutes later, High observed Desi ride by on a skateboard,
this time holding a big stick. (R. 234:286-287.) No words were exchanged between
Desi, High or Cristobal during this encounter. (R. 234:286-287.)
Later that evening, High left Cristobal on the Provo River Trail, but shortly
thereafter observed Desi and Emilio approach Cristobal. (R. 234:287-291.) (R. 234:289291.) High returned to the trail to rejoin Cristobal, and observed that Desi was carrying a
pool cue and was taunting Cristobal. (R. 234:291-292.)
Desi seemed agitated, and High bent down to pick up a rock in case he needed to
defend himself. (R. 234:293-296.) While High was picking up the rock, Desi charged
him. (R. 234:296.) High hit Desi with the rock, and Desi dropped the pool cue. (R.
234:296-297.)

High picked up the pool cue and hit Desi in the head with it.

(R.

234:297.) High then felt Emilio punch him from the back, so he stood up and hit Emilio
in the head with the pool cue. (R. 234:297.) High testified that Cristobal had no weapon
and was not involved in the fight. (R. 234:296, 298.) When the altercation had ended,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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High said the letters "PVL." (R. 234:298.)
Credibility was a significant issue at trial. Desi, the primary alleged victim in the
case, testified on direct examination that he had a felony conviction for possession with
intent to distribute, and that he could not recall any other criminal convictions. (R.
233:189-190.)

However, on cross-examination, High established that Desi also had

convictions for burglary and shoplifting, which Desi testified that he had forgotten about
on direct examination. (R. 233:201-202.) Desi also testified on re-direct examination
that his burglary conviction arose from an incident in which he stole money from his
brother Emilio, the other alleged victim in the case, to buy drugs. (R. 233:208-209.)
High, on the other hand, testified that he had a felony conviction, but did not
explain the nature of the conviction because the District Court had ruled that evidence
pertaining to the conviction, other than the fact of conviction, was inadmissible. (R.
234:268-269, 302-303.)

Additionally, High admitted that he lied to police when

questioned about his involvement in the alleged incident and asked his cousin to give a
false alibi for him. (R. 234:300-301; 312-313.)
The State also established on cross-examination that High had the letters "PVL"
tattooed on his hand, that High had been a member of PVL for approximately four years,
that Cristobal was a former member of PVL, and that High and Cristobal were involved
in PVL together during most of the time High had been a member. (R. 234:304-305.)
After establishing these facts, the State asked "Okay, now this organization, PVL,
what does it do; what is it about?" (R. 234:305.) High objected to this question on the
grounds of Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and was overruled. (R. 234:305-306, 399.) Over High's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ongoing objection, the State then elicited testimony concerning High's prior involvement
i

in unrelated gang fights, and testimony establishing that members of PVL gained status
through violence:
Q. Mr. High, back to PVL, it's an organization that exists today. You're a

I

member of it?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, does this organization do any charitable work?
A. No.
i

Q. Is this organization involved in any business enterprise?
A. No.
Q. What is the purpose of this organization as you understand it?
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What is the whole purpose of PVL being an organization? Why does it exist?
A. It's just a gang.
Q. A gang?

^^

A. Yeah.
Q. What is their purpose?
A. I just don't understand what you're saying.
Q. Well, you know, Kodak, you've heard of that?
A. No.
Q. Okay, how about Macintosh Computers, Apple Computers; you've heard of
that. That's a corporation. They're - they exist to do business.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. All right.
Q. The Red Cross, you've heard of them, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. They exist to do charitable work. Why does PVL exist?
A. Do graffiti and stuff.
Q. Is there any territory associated with PVL? In the name it has "Provo." Is
there a territorial boundary for PVL?
A. Provo.
Q. Okay, does the organization do anything to be able to protect or to be able to
assert itself within that boundary?
A. We have conflicts with rival gangs.
Q. "Conflicts," meaning?
A. Fights.
Q. Fights?
A. Yeah.
Q. Willingly coming together to meet a rival gang to fight?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you understand th^t that's probably illegal?
A. Yeah.
Q. But the organization doesn't have a problem with that?
A. No.
Q. So you participated in that kind of similar activity before?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Yeah.
i

Q. So the organization exists to fight rival gangs?
A. Yeah.
I

Q. Are there differing - differing degrees of people within PVL, or is everybody
much - pretty much equal?
A. Pretty much equal.
Q. Is there any status at all within PVL? Is there any way that you gain status and
reputation? Like, for instance, in my business as an attorney, you know, I gain
reputation by being a good attorney, and achieving results. Is there anything like
that in PVL? Is there anything that would give you nay [sic] kind of status within
PVL?
A. Just the like all the fighting and stuff.
Q. Okay.
A. Just the stuff you do.
Q. So the more that you do or the braver you are or the more aggressive you are,
that gives you status?
A. Yeah.
Q. You've been in there for like four years?
A. Yeah.
(R. 234:306-309.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that evidence concerning
High's participation in unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of PVL gain
status through violence, was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it admits evidence under Rule 404(b)
without conducting a "scrupulous examination," which requires that the District Court
determine 1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose; 2)
whether the evidence is relevant; and 3) whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Nelson-Waggoner,
2000UT59,6P.3dll20.
In this case, the District Court's examination of evidence concerning High's
violent gang activities did not meet the requirements of Nelson-Waggoner. The District
Court conducted an extremely limited analysis of the non-character purpose of the
evidence, and conducted no analysis of the evidence's probative value and potential for
unfair prejudice.

This evidence was highly prejudicial, and there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury would have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been
excluded. Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SCRUPULOUS EXAMINATION UNDER UTAH R. EVID.
404(B)
'
• - *
The District Court abused its discretion by admitting character evidence

concerning High's participation in unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of
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PVL gained status through violence, because the District Court failed to scrupulously
1

examine this evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). When considering whether to admit
evidence under Rule 404(b), the District Court is required to conduct a scrupulous
examination of the evidence, which includes a determination 1) whether the evidence is

I

offered for a proper, non-character purpose; 2) whether, pursuant to Rule 402, the
evidence is relevant; and 3) whether, pursuant to Rule 403, the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. NelsonWaggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120; see also State v. Ferguson, 2011 WL 923943
i

(awaiting publication).
a.

The "scrupulous examination" standard
When considering whether to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court is

required to conduct a "scrupulous examination" of the evidence.

Nelson-Waggoner,

2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120. The defendant in Nelson-Waggoner was charged with five
counts of rape and tried separately for each count. 2000 UT % 6. The State identified ten
factual similarities in each of the five rapes charged. IcL at f 3. At the trial on the second
rape, the trial court permitted testimony under Rule 404(b) of two of the defendant's
other alleged victims, who testified that the defendant had raped them under factually
similar circumstances. Id. at ff 9-13.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court was required to
conduct a "scrupulous examination" of the evidence in the exercise of its discretion. Id.
at | 16. A scrupulous examination, the Court held, required a determination 1) whether
the evidence was offered for a proper, non-character purpose such as those specifically
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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listed in Rule 404(b); 2) whether the evidence met the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 402;
and 3) whether the character evidence met the requirements of Utah R. Evid 403. Id at
1118-20.
The Court held that the trial court conducted a scrupulous examination and
admitted the evidence in the proper exercise of its discretion. First, the Court held that
the trial court thoroughly determined that the evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose.

I d at ^ff 21-25.

In conducting its examination, the trial court

determined that the other alleged victims could not testify unless the State could
demonstrate that each rape about which testimony would be offered included at least six
of the ten factual similarities identified by the State. I d at f 23. When this requirement
was met, the trial court further ruled that the testimony of the other victims was
admissible because it tended to negate the defendant's argument that the victims
consented to intercourse, which the trial court properly deemed to be a non-character
purpose for presenting the evidence. Id at ff 23-25.
Second, the Court held that the trial court conducted a proper analysis under Utah
R. Evid. 402. Id at fflf 26-27. The evidence tended to establish lack of consent, one of
the two elements of the crime of rape, and the only issue at trial. Id at % 27. Thus, the
Court held, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence
was relevant. Id. at f 27.
Third, the Court held that the trial court conducted a proper analysis under Utah R.
Evid. 403. I d at fflf 28-31. The Court applied the factors recommended by State v.
Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-296 (Utah 1988), in making this holding. Id
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The Court held that the most important Shickles factors in the case were "the
similarities between the crimes" and "the interval of time that has elapsed between the
crimes." Id^ at ^| 29. There were significant similarities, the Court held, between the
various rapes allegedly committed by the defendant. Id at % 29. Furthermore, the time
between all of the incidents was only ten weeks. Id. at If 29. Other Shickles factors also
showed that the probative value of the bad acts evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at f 29. Thus, the Court held, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible. Id
b.

The District Court failed to adequately determine whether High's unrelated,
violent gang activities were offered for a proper, non-character purpose
In the present case, the District Court admitted testimony, over High's objection,

that High had previously participated in gang fights as a member of PVL that were
unrelated to the crimes charged, and that members of PVL gained status through violent
actions. (R. 234:306-309.) Prior to this testimony, High argued in a sidebar conference1
that the State should not be permitted to introduce the testimony on the grounds of Rule
404(b). (R. 234:305-306.)
The sidebar conference was conducted off the record, but High made a record of
the sidebar conference during his motion for a mistrial at the close of evidence. (R.
234:358-368.)

1

We note that the parties alerted the District Court of the need for a ruling on the
admissibility of this evidence well before this sidebar conference. See Defendant's
Demand for Utah Rules of 404(b) Evidence, R. 63-62; Plaintiffs Reply Re: Demand
Regarding 404(b) Evidence, R. 199-167; Argument on the First Morning of Trial, R.
233:11-12; Argument on the Second Morning of Trial, R. 234:269-272.
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The record of the sidebar conference reveals that the District Court failed to
conduct a scrupulous examination of the evidence under Rule 404(b). First, the District
Court failed to thoroughly examine whether the evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose. The substance of the District Court's determination on this point was
limited to the following statement:
The State of Utah was not aware whether or not these defendants were going to be
called as witnesses. Ultimately they were. Does any of this information go to
motive, knowledge, intent or identity? It does. Okay, if you wish to draft a jury
instruction relative to that issue, you're welcome.
(R. 234:367-368.)
The District Court's bare conclusion that the evidence was relevant for a noncharacter purpose does not meet the requirements of Nelson-Waggoner. The District
Court failed to identify factual similarities between High's prior actions in unrelated gang
fights and the assault alleged at trial, or give any other indication how evidence of these
prior bad acts would serve a permissible non-character purpose. See State v. Marchet
2009 UT App 262, fflf 39-46 & n. 9, 219 P.3d 75 (affirming admission of testimony of
other alleged crimes under Rule 404(b) where trial court identified factual similarities
between the alleged crimes and isolated similarities which were particularly probative to
the issues in the case).
Furthermore, the District Court did not explain how evidence that members of
PVL gained status in the gang through violent actions would serve a permissible non-
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character purpose. Thus, the District Court failed to adequately examine whether the
evidence was offered for a proper, non-character purpose.
c.

The District Court failed to conduct an analysis of the probative value and
prejudicial effect of High's unrelated, violent gang activities
Second, the District Court failed to conduct any analysis under Rule 403 relating

to the evidence of High's unrelated, violent gang activities as a member of PVL.

The

District Court did not apply the Shickles factors, or make any comment on the potential
prejudicial effect of this evidence.
The prejudicial effect of High's testimony regarding prior participation in
unrelated gang fights, and evidence that members of PVL gained status through violence,
substantially outweighed the probative value of this evidence. At trial in the present case,
there were essentially two issues for the jury: 1) the credibility of High and co-defendant
Cristobal versus the credibility of the State's witnesses, Desi and Emilio Maciel; and 2)
High's relationship with Cristobal and the other unidentified participant in the alleged
assault. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202 and 76-9-101.
Evidence of High's participation in unrelated gang fights as a member of PVL,
and evidence that members of PVL gain status through violence, was highly prejudicial
as to the credibility issue. Credibility was important throughout the trial. See Statement
of Relevant Facts, supra. Since both Desi Maciel's credibility and High's credibility

2

The District Court conducted an analysis under Rule 403, using the factors articulated in
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), in determining whether to admit evidence of
High's prior third-degree felony conviction. (R. 234:259-269.) However, the District
Court made no such analysis in determining whether evidence of High's unrelated,
violent gang activities as a member of PVL should be admitted.
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were substantially questionable, it is reasonably likely that inadmissible evidence
regarding High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities tipped the scales of
credibility in the State's favor, and affected the jury verdict.
Furthermore, evidence of High's participation in unrelated, violent gang activities
was not relevant to this issue of High's relationship with co-defendant Cristobal and the
other unidentified participant. At the point that this evidence was offered and objected to,
the State had already established that someone yelled the letters "PVL" at the end of the
alleged incident, that PVL was a gang, that High had a PVL tattoo on his hand, and that
both High and co-defendant Cristobal had been members of PVL. (R. 234:303-305.)
While the evidence to that point was probative of the relationship between High
and Cristobal, and also probative of their alleged collusion in carrying out the alleged
assault, see U.S. v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1999) (Gang affiliation admissible to
show the relationship between two persons where the relationship is a central issue),
evidence of High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities with PVL was not
probative of High's relationship with Cristobal or any motive for an assault on Desi and
Emilio Maciel, particularly since Desi and Emilio Maciel were not gang members. (R.
234:345.)
Additional evidence of High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities
merely established that High had a propensity for committing violent, gang-related
crimes, and it is reasonably likely that this inadmissible evidence influenced the jury to
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believe that High had a propensity for committing violent crimes, and affected the
ultimate verdict.3
An application of the Shickles factors also demonstrates that the prejudicial effect
of evidence concerning High's participation in unrelated, violent gang activities
substantially outweighed any probative value.

See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295-296.

Although the evidence of High's participation in those activities was strong, being High's
testimony from his own knowledge, there was no evidence presented as to the similarities
between the assault alleged at trial and High's participation in unrelated gang fights or
violent actions to gain status within PVL. Nor was there any evidence presented as to the
interval of time elapsed between these other bad acts and the assault alleged at trial.
Furthermore, evidence concerning these other bad acts was unnecessary, since it
was not probative of the relationship between High and co-defendant Cristobal or any
other issue at trial. And, most of all, evidence that High had a propensity for engaging in

3

See e.g. U.S. v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Evidence of gang membership
can be inflammatory, with the danger being that it leads the jury to attach a propensity for
committing crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative
feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict. Guilt by association is a genuine concern
whenever gang evidence is admitted." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted));
U.S. v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e have also long recognized the
substantial risk of unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence, noting that such
evidence is likely to be damaging to a defendant in the eyes of the jury and that gangs
suffer from poor public relations." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State
v. McDaniel 777 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 2010) ("[gang expert] testimony must be carefully
monitored by the district court so that the testimony will not unduly influence the jury or
dissuade it from exercising its independent judgment." (citation omitted)); Utz v. Com.,
505 S.E.2d 380 (Va. App. 1998) (recognizing that "evidence identifying a defendant as a
member of a gang may be prejudicial, since juries may associate such groups with
criminal activity and improperly convict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant's
character").
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violent gang activities had a high probability of rousing the jury to overmastering
hostility. See supra n. 3.
The District Court did not conduct a scrupulous analysis under Rule 404(b) of
evidence concerning High's unrelated, violent gang activities. It failed to adequately
determine whether the evidence was admissible for a proper non-character purpose, and
also failed to conduct an analysis of the probative value and prejudicial effect of this
evidence under Rule 403.4

Furthermore, the erroneous admission of this prejudicial

evidence was not harmless because it reasonably affected the ultimate verdict. Thus, the
District Court abused its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible under
Rule 404(b).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
High asks this Court to reverse the District Court's overruling of his objection to
evidence regarding his prior participation in gang fights as a member of PVL, and
evidence that members of PVL gain status through violence, and grant High a new trial.

4

In addition to ruling that evidence concerning High's violent gang activities was
admissible under Rule 404(b), the District Court also ruled that High opened the door to
character evidence concerning his violent gang activities because he chose to testify at
trial when there was evidence that he had yelled the letters "PVL" at the conclusion of the
alleged assault, and evidence that he had the letters "PVL" tattooed on his hand. (R.
234:366.) The basis for this ruling was unclear, as the District Court did not cite to the
Utah Rules of Evidence. It seems clear, at least, that High did not open the door under
Rules 404-405, as he was not a reputation or opinion witness, and did not testify as to his
own character for violence. See State v. Leber, 2009 UT 59, flj 20-23, 216 P.3d 964.
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ADDENDA
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULES 402-405
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.

RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the
prosecution;
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefiilness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
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(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, evidence
of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a
propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in relation to
a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a sexual offense or
an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under
Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.

RULE 405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a
person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of
specific instances of that person's conduct.
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